

1.1 As the RSS is not yet agreed and published, extreme caution should be used in giving weight to its policies and figures, the likes of which have been challenged in other parts of the country as well as in the south west.

1.2 The policy of “predict and provide” which has been used in the past and also to provide the figures for this Core Strategy has been discredited. Recent events have shown us precisely why this outdated methodology should not be used. The meanderings of politicians have shown that, whichever party wins the election, a period of austerity will follow. Every attempt will be made to keep income rises low and tax rises will be substantial. In these circumstances the ability of people to buy houses will be severely limited. Recent statistics show that a number of immigrants who flooded into the country and put pressure on the housing stock are now moving back to their homelands. Political promises, if you believe them, indicate that there will be a more robust approach to illegal immigrants. And there have been suggestions that the problem of the proliferation of empty second houses will be tackled with a view to bringing more of them back into circulation. All of this suggests that the future need for housing should not be as high as the Core Strategy states and that a more cautious plan, monitor and manage approach should be adopted.

1.3 The proposed provision of 13,900 jobs over the period to 2026 has always been based on spurious assumptions. Firstly, the provision of new housing in Salisbury does not mean that the people who purchase here will want to work here, and the opposite is also true. Secondly, the proposed provision of the majority of the new jobs in Salisbury (especially when there is already employment land available elsewhere) means an unwarranted increase in the need for persons living outside Salisbury to journey there for their work. This will place enormous pressure on the infrastructure in south Wiltshire and will add unsustainability to the other problems the Core Strategy is generating.

1.4 A previous deputy prime minister recommended (we believe) at least 60% as a target for new housing to be built on brownfield sites. Although this is not a figure enshrined in statute, we find it disappointing that the Wiltshire Council target should be as low as 34% (CS 5.17 p. 47). Are real efforts being made to find and use brownfield sites (sometimes difficult, we appreciate) or is just the easy option being taken?

1.5 The Core Strategy insists “New housing will not be permitted outside the settlements named in Core Policy 1” (CS 5.17 p.48). Apart from a possible breach of human rights, we would query the legality of a policy which thus deprives scores of villages of control of their own futures. Many villages are dying because of a loss of facilities. Surely we should be attempting to rejuvenate them by an influx of new blood not assisting in their demise.

### Revised wording

Sadly, we have no change of wording for the majority of the above because of the constraints placed upon us for this Examination, but we feel the matters need saying because the figures of housing and employment demanded are the starting point for many of the problems we foresee stemming from this Strategy. And, of course, the List of Main Matters and Issues does raise questions as to their validity. CPRE is not against development as such but feels that the figures presented are too large, unwarranted and unsustainable.

We do suggest the following changes:

The Council’s target for housing development on previously developed land is ~~34%~~ **50%**..(CS p.47)

New housing will ~~not~~ be permitted outside the settlements named in Core Policy 1 **provided the community involved believes it to be warranted** (CS p.48)